An incessant conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) appears to be nearing a turning point if a peace deal signed in America holds. After years of failed ceasefires and mounting regional tensions, the United States has successfully brokered a peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC.
This diplomatic breakthrough stands in stark contrast to previous peace efforts led by African regional blocs—including Kenya, the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—which, despite noble intentions, failed to stop the crisis.
The US deal underscores critical shortcomings in African-led diplomacy and poses a real test for President William Ruto, who has staked his reputation on positioning Kenya as a regional peace broker.
The roots of the conflict lie in the resurgence of the M23 rebel group, which has taken control of large parts of North Kivu in eastern DRC since late 2021.
Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of supporting the rebels—a charge Kigali denies—while Rwanda accuses the DRC of harbouring the FDLR, a militia linked to the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan cenocide.
In 2023, the United States escalated its diplomatic engagement in the region. Secretary of State Antony Blinken appointed Ambassador Lucy Tamlyn as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, launching behind-the-scenes diplomacy involving both Kigali and Kinshasa.
Unlike earlier efforts that focused purely on political dialogue, the US brought in leverage—both carrots and sticks. It offered humanitarian assistance, military disengagement support, and financial aid through the World Bank and IMF, while quietly threatening targeted sanctions and aid freezes if the conflict escalated.
By February 2024, under Qatari co-facilitation, the two parties signed a draft security memorandum. Rwanda agreed to withdraw support from the M23, while the DRC pledged to dismantle FDLR networks. The US committed to funding DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration) programmes and supporting independent border monitoring. Both countries attended a formal signing ceremony in Washington, DC, marking the first time in over a decade that a major power has secured an enforceable deal on this issue.
While the US succeeded, African efforts stumbled. Kenya’s role was central in the EAC-led Nairobi Process, launched under former President Uhuru Kenyatta and continued under President Ruto. The EAC deployed a regional force (EACRF) into eastern Congo, with Kenyan troops playing a leading role.
But the mission was hamstrung from the start. The EACRF’s rules of engagement did not allow it to confront M23 fighters militarily, despite their ongoing attacks. This infuriated Congolese authorities, who accused the force of “observing instead of protecting.”
In early 2024, President Félix Tshisekedi declined to renew the EACRF’s mandate and called for its withdrawal, stating that it had failed to deliver any tangible security gains.
Meanwhile, the DRC shifted its focus to the SADC bloc, calling for troops from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania under a new regional mission. But the deployment was delayed by logistics, funding gaps, and political hesitation. Angola, which tried to mediate separately, struggled to align its diplomacy with SADC and EAC efforts.
Complicating matters further was Rwanda’s distrust of both Kenya and the EAC. Tensions escalated when a leaked EACRF memo in late 2023 labeled Rwanda a “destabilising actor.” Kigali also took issue with the visibility given to the DRC’s position over its own. Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame viewed Kenya as biased—especially after President Ruto hosted Tshisekedi for bilateral engagements twice in less than six months without a reciprocal visit to Kigali.
In July 2024, Kenya formally withdrew its troops from the EACRF, marking the collapse of its peacekeeping initiative in Congo.
President Ruto has boldly positioned Kenya as a continental mediator. From peace efforts in Sudan to pledging troops for Haiti, he has embraced a proactive diplomatic role. However, the Congo episode reveals structural weaknesses in his foreign policy approach.
Kenya lacks the kind of diplomatic leverage and enforcement tools available to global powers such as the United States. While Nairobi brings proximity, cultural alignment, and legitimacy, it often falls short in coercive or incentive-based diplomacy. Furthermore, Ruto’s foreign policy has sometimes appeared overstretched and undercoordinated.
Critics also point to a trust deficit in regional circles. Rwanda, for instance, questioned Kenya’s neutrality, while the DRC grew disillusioned with Nairobi’s military and diplomatic promises.
Meanwhile, domestic unrest—sparked by controversial tax proposals in mid-2024—threatens to erode Ruto’s political capital and distract him from his diplomatic agenda.
The success of the US-brokered deal should not be viewed as a failure of African diplomacy, but rather a call to strengthen it. Africa has the tools, legitimacy, and understanding to solve its own problems—but it must overcome fragmentation, limited leverage, and internal rivalries.
Kenya’s role in the Congo crisis underscores a broader challenge: good intentions must be backed by strategic depth, consistency, and credible neutrality. For President Ruto, the road to becoming a respected regional statesman requires more than visibility and troop deployment—it demands alignment, trust-building, and regional coherence.
African leaders should take note. Mediation is no longer about hosting dialogue; it’s about delivering outcomes. And in this case, the Americans did just that.
The writer is a regional affairs analyst and operations strategist based in Nairobi.
