Why aviation sector strike wasn’t inevitable

The first warning sign was management's unilateral stoppage of agency-fee remittances to the union—a move that instantly eroded trust and signalled contempt for established labour processes.

Mutual suspicion then metastasised: union leaders alleged that management was practising divide-and-rule, engaging only a faction within Kawu while quietly sponsoring a splinter union. Even if unproven, that rumour became a powerful undercurrent, hardening positions and narrowing the space for compromise.

The most revealing symptom of the breakdown was the union's demand that KAA's Chief Executive Moses Wekesa, be removed—an indication that the conflict had become personal and political, not merely technical.

When leaders treat union dues as leverage, sideline recognised representatives, and allow rumours of splinter unions to fester, they invite exactly the kind of paralysis that cost Kenya two days of aviation normalcy and left thousands of passengers stranded.

The lesson is plain: in high-stakes sectors like aviation, relational competence should be a mandatory requirement for leadership. In retrospect the episode, offered a useful lesson in the unintended consequences of Kenya's experiment with the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC).

Consider this scenario: an employer and a workers' union negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and reach an understanding. When the time comes to implement it, they are told they cannot do so until another party—the SRC—gives its nod.

For many years, collective bargaining has been one of the pillars of industrial peace in Kenya. Employers and unions negotiate over wages and working conditions, make concessions, and eventually arrive at a bargain that both sides are expected to honour.

The arrival of the SRC after the 2010 Constitution changed this equation in the public sector. The rationale was compelling: Kenya needed an institution capable of bringing order to public-sector remuneration and addressing disparities.

Nobody can seriously argue against those objectives. But there is a difference between controlling public-sector remuneration and becoming a third party to collective bargaining. The historical record suggests that the SRC's original conception was principally concerned with rationalising and harmonising remuneration for state officers—political appointees.

Public Service Commission experts and historians will tell you that the original thinking came from the recommendations of the 1999 Kipkulei Harmonisation Commission on Terms and Conditions of Service in the Public Service. The function of negotiating and setting wages for public servants generally was to be left to their employers—the Public Service Commission, the Teachers Service Commission, the Judicial Service Commission, the Parliamentary Service Commission, and others.

We have ended up with an uncomfortable paradox: an institution created to impose discipline on public-sector remuneration now finds itself entangled in wage disputes, strikes and litigation. While it would be wrong to say the SRC caused all these disputes, the constitutional body has not found wide acceptance within Kenya's industrial relations setup.

To be fair, Kenya's public service has expanded enormously, devolution has created new layers of government, and the 2010 Constitution has transformed citizens' expectations of their rights.

The real question is whether the SRC should sit as a third party at the bargaining table. Perhaps its role should instead be to establish the parameters—affordability, comparability, salary structures, fiscal sustainability, and principles for remuneration—within which employers and employees are then free to negotiate. The referee should enforce the rules of the game; he should not play in it.

If anything, the truth is that, as things stand, the SRC cannot actually control the wage bill. It has no means of controlling how many people government hires, how many new cadres are created, how establishments expand, how many people are promoted, or how many special contractual positions are created.

You cannot permanently control the wage bill by squeezing the salaries of established public servants while allowing government to keep expanding the number of people on its payroll. It is like trying to reduce a household's electricity bill while having no control over how many appliances keep being added to the house.

The real test of an institution in the industrial relations space is whether it promotes industrial peace.

The writer is a former managing editor of The EastAfrican.